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Many companies and organizations offer IT-services (news papers, social
sites, web developers and etc.) to the public, and those services needs to be
protected. The amount of computer threats are increasing drastically, and
many attacks are directed to those services companies offer. Larger compa-
nies have the economy to buy expensive security tools to protect their services,
while smaller companies may have the same economy.
Open source is an interesting field for those who do not have the need or
the economy to buy expensive security solutions. Intrusion detection system
is a well known security tool, and it could either be bought as a payment so-
lution, or be downloaded from the web as an open source solution. Snort,
Bro and Suricata are three different open source network intrusion detection
systems.
By comparing installation, configuration, alarms and information one can
find out which solution that fits your network best. The process of setting up
the test environment, installation and configuration of Snort, Bro and Suricata,
and installation of Metasploit have been a time consuming process. Snort, Bro
and Suricata have been tested in a network, and against a Metasploit frame-
work with known exploits. Running Snort, Bro and Suricata in a network,
have shown huge differences regarding the number of alarms produced, and
also differences in the logs produced. The results after running Metasploit
showed some unexpected but clarifying results in the logs created. The whole
process has been evaluated, and there has been given a summary of Snort, Bro
and Suricata regarding installation, configuration and alarms.
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The last few years the amount of malicious traffic on internet have increased
enormously, [1] in a way that should be looked into with concern. Malicious
traffic can cause loss or harm of data on computers, and loss of sensitive infor-
mation is something that occasionally happens. [2]
Companies spend billions of dollars on computer security each year, [3] but
still computers get infected or compromised by malicious traffic. Unaware em-
ployees, hackers, organized cyber criminals and unknown vulnerabilities are
different reasons to why systems get compromised. Large companies and gov-
ernmental organizations need the best tools available to prevent intrusions,
since their companies are more exposed to malicious traffic.
The best firewalls, antivirus, intrusion prevention systems and other secu-
rity tools available are expensive. Large companies can afford this tools, but
what about smaller companies? They do not have the same economy, and not
the same need of the best and most expensive computer security tools.
One common rule companies use about security, is that the amount of
money spent on security should not be higher than the cost of loss of data
or compromised computers. This is something companies should find out be-
fore investing in security tools. Normally large and governmental companies
have more important information to protect than smaller companies have, and
therefore they need to invest in the best security tools available. Smaller com-
panies does not have the same need, and should they invest the same amount
of money in security tools? In most cases they don’t have the same need, and
therefore is open source an area that should be interesting these kinds of com-
panies.
The open source community have some advantages compared to payment
solutions, where one of the advantages are the available source code. People
using open source software can collaborate and contribute with own results
and experiences to help each other to solve problems and for improvement.
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When buying a firewall, an intrusion detection system or an intrusion preven-
tion system, one often get a preconfigured box which are set up in the network
and left there. By using open source security tools, one can interact with other
open source users, search for solutions, and get much more information.
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a well known security tool used by
companies to prevent loss and harm of data. Companies such as Palo Alto
and Sourcefire are two of the leading companies in this business. Palo Alto
has only got a payment solution while Sourcefire has both a payment solution
and a open source solution, the Snort IDS. In addition to Snort, there exist
two other known open source intrusion detection systems, Bro and Suricata.
Snort and Bro have existed since 1998, while Suricatas first stable version was
released in July 2010.
An open source intrusion detection system is a good option for compa-
nies and organizations which do not have the same amount of money as the
larger companies and governmental organizations have. When choosing open
source intrusion detection system, one should have some knowledge about
how to set them up, how to use them, and how to respond to the different
alarms they create when running them in the network. It is difficult to know
which intrusion detection system to choose whithout any previous knowl-
edge.
Reality
Choices you make as leader of a company will affec the quality the network se-
curity of the company. Internet brings the world into your office, and with both
opportunities and threats. Attackers automatically search for poorly secured
system, and take control of these to use it in further attacks against others.
There is no reason to think that a small company will be overlooked.
It is important to be aware of both internal as well as external threats. A
survey made by Symantec in 2010[1], showed that about 50 per cent of all inci-
dents are caused by employees. It could be an employee who cause accidents,
or employees causing harm with the purpose of taking revenge or earn money.
Both internal and external threats may have serious consequences.
The management of companies often see IT security as a cost, and not as
a tool to prevent the system from being compromised, and they want it to be
kept as low as possible. Becoming a victim of computer crime or accident can
quickly become more expensive. How much do a business interruption, loss
of working hours, cleanup work and lost sensitive information cost? Techni-
cal protection measures are important, but not worth anything if they do not
work.
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1.2 Threats, security and IDS
The amount of malicious traffic are increasing, and new threats are created ev-
ery day. The threats are getting more and more serious, complex and sophis-
ticated. There are no longer teeanagers playing around creating viruses and
worms that are the biggest problem for companies and organizations. Inside
threats and organized cyber criminals looking for sensitive information, such
as social security number and bank accounts, are some of the biggest problem
today. These kinds of threats are getting worse, and companies need tools to
prevent their system from being compromised.
When there are so many threats to be aware of, computer security becomes
more and more important. The goal with computer security is to prevent prop-
erty theft, corruption and natural disaster, and at the same time make sure
that the information and property remain accessible for its intended users. As
well, to protect valuable information and services from publication, tamper-
ing or collapse by unauthorized activities or untrustworthy individuals, and
unplanned events.
Firewall is designed to deny or permit traffic based on preset rules. Even
though if a firewall is well designed and configured, there exists threats that
can pass through it. It could be malicious traffic that looks like normal traffic
or cyber criminals hacking into the system. Most organizations find the need
of additional hardware, software and network monitoring tools.
Antivirus is another computer security tool, which are designed to detect,
prevent and remove malware. It is able to detect malware based on signatures
and by anomaly detection. However, it is possible for a computer to be in-
fected by new malware where there are no signature in the antivirus database.
When a new malware is detected, countermeasures can be put in place to block
or rid your computer of this type of code. But sometimes it can be too late and
the harm is already done. It is desirable to stop malware in an earlier phase.
Firewall and antivirus used together gives a certain protection, but the
question is if it is enough. Hackers can get passed a firewall, and comput-
ers can be infected and be compromised before the antivirus program detects
it. Companies need some software and hardware that monitors the network
for malicious traffic, and stops it before it does any harm. Intrusion detection
system is a device or software application that monitors the network and/or
system activities for malicious activities or policy violations and produces re-
ports to system administrator.
There are two ways of setting up an intrusion detection system. One is
host based intrusion detection, and the other is network intrusion detection.
Network intrusion detection system is the most used. Snort, Bro and Suricata
are three different network intrusion detection systems, and a network intru-
sion detection system monitors incoming, outgoing and internal traffic. When
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malicious traffic is detected, alarms are created and sent as a report to network
or system administrator.
1.2.1 Problem statement
When comparing Snort, Bro and Suricata there are different things one can
comapere, such as:
1. Compare the installation procedure
2. Compare alarms when run against normal traffic in a computer network





There are three seperate but valuable components in a computer system; hard-
ware, software and data. [4] By analyzing the security in a computer system,
one can find how the system or the information can experience some loss or
harm. An example is to find out which information one wants to protect, and
make sure that it is only accessible for those who should have access.
A threat can be a set of a circumstances that have the potential to cause
loss or harm.[4] There exists many kinds of threats, including threats caused
by humans and by computers. Unintentional human errors, design flaws and
software failures are common errors in larger companies and organizations.
Earthquake, flood and stolen equipments are threats as well, because it can
damage the equipment or cause loss.
Computer systems can be compromised in many different ways; through
crimeware, hacking, phishing, spam, social engineering, virus, worms and
etc. Many cyber criminals look for known vulnerabilities in systems and uti-
lizes this vulnerability to gain access to the system. There exists four kinds
of threats: interception, interruption, modification and fabrication.[4] An in-
terception is when an unauthorized persons, system or program has gained
access to an asset. Illegal copying of program files or data files or wiretapping
to obtain data in a network is examples of interception.
An interruption is when an asset becomes lost, unavailable or unusable.
An example is malicious destruction of a hardware device or erasure of a pro-
gram or data file. Modification is when an unauthorized person, program or
system access and tamper with an asset. An example is if an unauthorized
party change the value in a database, alter a program so that it perform differ-
ent, or modify data being transmitted electronically.[4]
It is called a fabrication if somebody unauthorized party creates a counter-
feit object which looks like the other objects on a system. The intruder can
insert suspicious transactions to a network communication system, or add
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records to an existing database. Sometimes these additions can be detected
as forgeries, but if skillfully done, they are almost impossible to distinguish
from the real thing.
A malicious attacker must have three things to perform an attack; method,
opportunity and motive.[4] The attacker must have the skills, knowledge and
tools to pull the attack, the time and access to accomplish the attack, and a
reason to want to perform this attack against this system. If one of this three
are missing, the attacker will not be able to perform the attack. Anyway, is not
easy to cut one of these off. [4]
It is difficult to determine an attacker’s motive to attack a system. Some
systems are attacked because they are attractive targets, which mean they are
interesting to attackers. Other popular targets include law enforcement and
defense department computers, because they are presumed to be well pro-
tected, and a successful attack will show skills.[4] And some targets are at-
tacked just because they are easy targets or just because they are there; ran-
dom, unassuming victims. Anyone can be a victim of an attack by an attacker
with time, opportunity and knowledge.
2.1.1 Malware
Malware is short for malicious software, and it is software designed to cause
harm or loss to a system without the owner knowing it.[5] It is an expres-
sion to mean a variety of forms of hostile, intrusive, or annoying software or
program code. Malware includes viruses, worms, Trojan horses, dishonest ad-
ware, scareware, crimeware, most rootkits and other malicious and unwanted
software.[5] The most common malware from criminals are by World Wide
Web and email.
Software is considered to be malware based on the creators intention, rather
than any particular feature. Malware is common by organized criminals, and
the general lack of protection against newly produced malware, brings a new
mindset for business on Internet, since some percentage of Internet customers
will always be infected for some reason or another. And they need to continue
doing business with infected customers.
2.1.2 Purposes
In the late 1990’s and the start of 21th century, many viruses and worms were
written as experiments and pranks. They were intended to be harmless or just
annoying, and not cause any harm or loss. Sometimes the perpetrators did not
realize how much harm the malware would do. Young programmers wrote
them simply for practice, or to see how far they could go.
Since the broadband Internet access started to rise, malicious software has
been designed for a profit. Since 2003, the majority of widespread viruses
and worms were created to take control of users computers for black market
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exploitation. Infected ’zombie’ computers are used to send spam mail, to host
contraband data such as child pornography, or to engage in distributed denial
of service attacks as form of extortion.
Another malware that has emerged, is spyware, and it is designed to mon-
itor users web browsing, display unwanted advertisements, or redirect mar-
keting revenues to the spyware creator. Spyware do not spread like viruses;
they are generally installed by exploiting vulnerabilities, or are packaged with
user installed software.
2.2 Computer security
The objective of computer security is to prevent information and property
theft, corruption, or natural disaster, while making the information and prop-
erty remain accessible to its intended users. Computer security includes soft-
ware, hardware, processes and mechanisms which intend to protect sensitive
and valuable information from publication, tampering or collapse by unau-
thorized activities, or untrustworthy individuals and unplanned events. [6]
When talking about computer security, there are three important aspects of
any related system; confidentiality, integrity and availability. Confidentiality
makes sure that assets only get accessed by authorized parties, which means
that those who should have access to something get that access. Access means
reading, viewing, printing or knowing that particular asset exists.
Integrity means that assets can only be modified by authorized parties or
only in authorized ways. Availability means that assets are accessible to autho-
rized parties at appropriate times.[4] In other words, if some person or system
has legitimate access to a particular set of objects, that asset should not be pre-
vented. For this reason, availability is sometimes known by its opposite, denial
of service.
One of the challenges when creating a secure system is finding the right
balance among the goals, which often conflicts. For example, it is easy to pre-
serve particular objects confidentiality simply by preventing everyone from
reading that object. But by doing this, the files is not accessible for those who
should have access, and it does not meet the requirement of avaialability. It
must be a balance between confidentiality and availability.
There exist many different technologies and approaches to prevent the sys-
tem from being compromised, or experience loss or harm. Firewall, antivirus,
anti-spyware, intrusion prevention system, security policies, authentication,
access control list, cryptography, backups and web scanner are tools that pre-




A firewall is the first line of defense for hosts connected to the Internet. It is
a device that inspects all messages entering or leaving the intranet, and by
looking at the content of the message it either accept or drop messages based
on preset rules.[7] The standard way to set up a firewall is to deny all traffic,
and then set rules that open for what kind of traffic you want to allow going
through the firewall. If traffic does not match any of the preset rules, it will get
stopped by the firewall.
There are several types of firewall techniques used to stop unwanted traf-
fic, such as packet filters, application gateway, proxy server and network ad-
dress translation (NAT).[8] They use different strategies or methods to stop un-
wanted traffic. Some of the methods the firewalls uses, is filter packets based
on the information ine the packets (combination of the packets source and des-
tination address, its protocol, and, for tcp and udp traffic, the port number),
understand certain applications such as FTP, DNS and HTTP, detect if an un-
wanted protocol try to get through a non-standard port or if a protocol is being
abused in any harmful way.
Other methods firewalls use to stop unwanted traffic, is they can filter
based on protocols, TTL values, netblock of originator, of the source, and many
other attributes. It can inspect many different network flows, grant access to
several networks and services, and it often cooperate with secure vpn system,
intrusion detection systems, intrusion prevention systems, remote access ser-
vice access (RAS) and other security systems
Even though firewall offer many methods to stop unwanted traffic, it has
some weaknesses. The firewall is difficult to configure and keep up to date,
and maintenance tasks become increasingly vulnerable for misconfigurations
and errors.[9] And the firewall inspect only messages or packet passing through
the firewall, and not traffic at the internal network. As well, cleaver hackers
can pass a firewall and the firewall can create a form of an alarm, but it doesn’t
keep track of the intrusion or get information about it like an intrusion detec-
tion system would.
Antivirus
Antivirus is software used to prevent, detect and remove malware, such as
computer viruses, computer worms, Trojan horses, spyware and other kinds
of malware.[10] It uses different methods to these threats. The most common
method is the signature based method, which detects computer viruses, com-
puter worms and other kinds of malware by comparing the content of a file
to a database or dictionary of malware signatures. But this method don’t have




To detect new malware, the anomaly based (also called heuristic) method
is used. Many viruses’ starts as single infection and through either muta-
tion or refinements by other attacks can grow into many different variants.[10]
Generic signatures is a anomaly based approach, and it can detect new viruses
and variants of existing viruses by looking for known malicious code, or slight
variations of such code, in files. These two methods, signature based and
anomaly based, are the same methods as an intrusion detection system uses,
but in little bit different way.
2.2.1 Intrusion detection system
An intrusion detection system can either be a device or a software application.
Intrusion detection system focuses on detecting intrusions, logging informa-
tion about them, and reports them to system administrator.[11] As well, or-
ganizations use intrusion detection system to identify problems with security
policies, documenting existing threats and detect individuals that violate the
security policy.
There are two main types of intrusion detection system (IDS); network IDS
(NIDS) and host based IDS (HIDS). The NIDS is an independent platform that
examines network traffic and monitoring multiple hosts to identify malicious
activity. The usual way to set up a NIDS is by connecting it to a network hub,
network switch configured for port mirroring, or network tap.[12] Sensors are
placed at choke points in the network to be monitored, often in the demilita-
rized zone or at network borders. The sensors capture all network traffic and
analyze the content of each packet for malicious content.
A host based IDS is placed on a host, where it detect intrusions by analyz-
ing system calls, applications logs, file-system modifications, and other host
activities and state. The sensors usually consist of a software agent.
There are two different techniques an IDS uses to detect malicious traf-
fic/activity; statistical anomaly based IDS and signature based IDS. Statistical
anomaly based IDS set up a baseline of what kind of traffic is seemed as nor-
mal. By looking at the bandwidth use, what protocols are used, what kind of
ports and devices that are generally connected to each other, one can make a
baseline of this, and when sample of traffic is outside this baseline, an alert
will be created and send to the administrator.
The signature based IDS monitors the network and comparing the pack-
ets against preset signatures; which is signatures of known attacks. When the
signature based IDS detect packets or traffic that match some of the signatures
in the database, it will create an alarm about that malicious traffic and report
to administrator. The problem with signature based IDS, is that it cannot de-
tect malicious traffic where no signature has been made yet, but the statistical
anomaly based IDS will be able to detect this.
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There are some functions and concepts one should know of regarding in-
trusion detection system. An alert/alarm is a signal that suggests your system
has been or being attacked, and this alarm can either be a ’true positive’ or a
’false positive’. A true positive is if an intrusion has occurred and an alarm has
been created, and a false positive is when the intrusion detection system thinks
it is an intrusion and created an alarm, but the traffic was actually legitimate.
’False negative’ is when an attack doesn’t get detected, and ’false positive’ is
when no attack has taken place and no alarm has been created.
Site policy is guidelines within an organization that control the rules and
configurations of an IDS, while site policy awareness is the ability an IDS has
to dynamically change its rules and configurations in response to changing
environmental activity.
Other functions or concepts one should know about, is confidence value,
attacker or intruder, masquerader, misfeasor and clandestine user. Confidence
value is a value of how effective the intrusion detection system detects or iden-
tify an attack.
An intruder or attacker, is a person, program or system that tries to gain
unauthorized access to information, do harm or other form of malicious activ-
ity. Masquerader is an unauthorized user who tries to access the system as an
authorized user, and a misfeasor is usually an internal user that either is an
authorized user with limited permissions or a user with full permissions and
who misuse their powers. A clandestine user is a user who acts as a supervisor
and tries to use his privileges to avoid being captured.
Snort
Snort was created by Martin Roesch in 1998, and is an open source network
intrusion detection and prevention system.
Snort can be used in three different ways; as a packet sniffer like tcpdump,
a packet logger or as a network intrusion detection and prevention system.[13]
When used as a packet sniffer, Snort will read network packets and display
them on the console, and when used as packet logger Snort will log packets
to disk. In intrusion detection mode it will monitor the network traffic and
analyze the traffic against a rule set defined by the user.
In intrusion detection mode, Snort uses a number of rules that define anoma-
lous traffic. Most of these rules are made by Sourcefire, and other rules are
made by the community, and it is possible to make own rules as well. In ad-
dition to rules, Snort has several preprocessors which enable modules to view
and alter packets before they get inspected by the intrusion detection system.
[13]
When running Snort, it works by detecting and reporting malicious traf-
fic or so called events. The process of reporting events can be configured
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through event handling. By configuring thresholds one can reduce the num-
ber of logged alerts for noisy rules. This helps Snorts to handle more traffic.
[2]
Snort has the capability to or can be configured to send output to various
locations, when certain Snort rules is triggered. The most common output
module is the alert syslog. Other output modules exist, such as ’alert fast’ and
’alert full’. ’Alert fast’ put a fast entry to the file specified, while ’alert full’
sends the entire packet header along with the event message. [14]
Snort is capable of performing real time traffic analysis, which means that it
can detect ongoing intrusions. It can perform logging on IP networks, perform
protocol analysis, content searching and content matching, and it can be used
to detect a variety of attacks and probes, such as bugger overflows, stealth port
scans, CGI attacks, SMB probes, OS fingerprinting and much more. [14]
Snort can be combined with other software, such as SnortSnarf, OSSIM,
sguil, Snorby, Razorback and Basic Analysis and Security Engine (BASE) to
provide visual representation of intrusion data. [13]
Another important thing with Snort is that one need to registrate at Snorts
website to be able do download the ruleset. The official snort rules is the rules
maintaiend by the vulnerability research team (VRT). Sourcefire has to keep
Snort as an open platform, and they host rules submitted by the communiy
(Snort users). These rules are distributed under the GPL and are freely avail-
able to all Snort users. [? ]
Bro
Bro was founded by Vern Paxson in 1998, and is an open source UNIX based
network intrusion detection system. Bro passively monitors network traffic
and look for malicious traffic. It detect intrusions by first parsing network traf-
fic and then execute event oriented analyzers that compare the activity with
patterns deemed malicious.[15] The analyses include detection of specific at-
tacks (signature and events) and unusual activities (anomalous).
Bro is normally placed at a key network junction, where it can be used to
monitor all incoming and outgoing traffic. Bro provides functionality such as
collecting, filtering and analyzing of network traffic. It is capable of giving a
detailed analysis of popular protocols, and the output of this analysis is several
events that describe the observed activity.
Bro comes with a set of policy scripts, which is designed to detect the most
common internet attacks, while limiting the number of false positives, in ex-
ample, alerts that confuse uninteresting activity with the important attack ac-
tivity. Bro policy scripts are programs written in the Bro language, and the
scripts contain rules that describe what kind of traffic or activities that are
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looked as malicious. When analyzing the network activity, it initiates actions
based on the analysis. [15]
The policy incorporates a signature matching facility that looks for traf-
fic that matches these signatures. These signatures are expressed as regular
expressions, and Bro’ signature matching capability allows Bro to not only ex-
amine network content, but to understand the context of signature, greatly
reducing the number of false positives. [15]
In addition to signatures, Bro can also analyze network protocols, connec-
tions, data amounts, incorporating it into analysis of new activity.
The policy script can generate output files of activity on the network, and
it can generate problem alerts to event logs, including the operating system
syslog. As well, the scripts can execute programs, which, in turn, send email
messages, page the on-call staff, automatically terminate existing connections,
or, with appropriate additional software, insert access control blocks into a
routers access control list. [15]
A site can adapt Bro’s operation by its specialized policy language and
when new attacks is discovered. If anything is detected, Bro can generate a
log entry, alert the operator in real time and execute an operating system com-
mand (terminate a connection for example). As well, Bro’s detailed log files
can be used to forensics.
Suricata
Suricata is an open source intrusion detection and prevention system devel-
oped by the ’Open Information Security Foundation’. The beta version was
released in December 2009, while the first stable version came in July 2010.
Suricata was created to bring new ideas and technology to the intrusion detec-
tion field. [16]
Open Information Security Foundation (OISF) provides Suricata with in-
trusion detection and prevention rule set, and the process of maintaining op-
timal security level is simplified by the Suricata engine. Suricata is able to use
rules from different resources, such as Emerging Threats and Snort VRT rules,
to provide the best rule set possible. [16]
As other network intrusion detection systems, Suricata monitor network
traffic and create alarms/alerts logs when malicious traffic is detected. Suri-
cata is designed to be compatible with other security components, and it offers
features such as unified output functionality, and it is possible to accept calls
from other applications through its pluggable libraries.
Suricata offers increased speed and efficiency in network traffic analysis
with its multithreaded engine.[16] In addition to hardware acceleration, the
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engine is build to utilize the increased processing power of the latest multi-
core CPU. The engine supports and provides functionality such as the latest
Snort VRT, Snort logging, rule language options, multithreading, hardware ac-
celeration, unified output enabling interaction with external log management
systems and IPv6.[17] As well, it supports and provides functionality such as
rule based IP reputation, library plug ability for interaction with other applica-
tions, statistics output, and a simple and effective getting started user manual.
Sourcefire
Sourcefire Inc is a company founded in 2001 by Martin Roesch, and it devel-
ops network security and software, which is a commercial version of Snort
software.[? ] In addition, Sourcefire is committing to advancing open source
technology and continue to maintain ties with the snort user community. [18]
Sourcefire is one of the leading companies within this field, and the com-
pany’s initial growth was funded with 56.5 million dollar from several venture
investors. Several companies have tried to buy the company without any luck,
and at the end of 2008 the company had over 100 million dollar in cash and
equivalents. In 2009 Sourcefire received the ”Reader Trust” award for the best
IDS/IPS solution for Snort, Network World’s ”2009 Best of tests” award for
the Sourcefire 3D system. [18]
The Sourcefire 3D system is an intrusion prevention system solution that
provides a layered security defense. The Sourcefire 3D modules include intru-
sion prevention system (IPS), real-time network awareness (RNA), real-time
user awareness (RUA) and defense center (DC). [18]
Snort is an open source network intrusion detection and prevention sys-
tem that uses a rule language which combines signatures and anomaly based
inspection methods. The open source community has helped Snort getting de-
veloped to be the most widely used intrusion detection and prevention tech-
nology.
Palo Alto
Palo Alto Networks identifies applications independent of port, protocol, eva-
sive tactics and SSL encryption. When applications identifies, they can be man-
aged after the organizations policy. Many cleaver users use SSL for encryption
to avoid proxy filters that exists in the network. Palo Alto Networks decrypts
this SSL tunnel, so that the application that hides in the encrypted tunnel can
identifies. [19]
Palo Alto Networks integrates with Active Directory or eDirectory to iden-
tify users. This means that the firewall rules can be made to apply exam rules,
which give limited access to internet during exam. With good planning, access
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can be managed by dragging groups into Active Directory and into specific
groups.[19] With user information available, it is easy to identify machines
that are attacked by virus, spyware and other threats.
Palo Alto Networks give unmatched overview of what happens in the net-
work. With built in report generator for screen and PDF, the organization get a
full overview of traffic in the network. Administrator get as well a control to let
through or block specific traffic based on criteria’s, such as zone, ip addresses,
user/usergroup and application.[19] For example so can one usergroup, stu-
dent, be accepted to use MSN, but not MSN file transfer. Access can be given
for specific times during a day, for example youtube can be accepted in lunch
and after school time, but not in the classes.
Palo Alto Networks can include both URL filtering and threat filtering.
One uses Brightcloud, which is the most complete database for blocking cho-
sen URL categories or simple URL’s. Threat filtering filtrates threats such as
virus, spyware, attacks on vulnerabilities, botnets and etc in real time.
Palo Alto Networks is not an UTM, but has a whole new architecture that
perform all tasks in the firewall, with a central interface for administration. A
policy gets created and includes all parameters, such as ip, user, application
URL filter and threat filter. With a Palo Alto firewall, one can replace existing
solutions for URL filters, IPS, inline virus filter and etc. In this way one can
reduce costs for maintenance and annual maintenance costs.
Including to the functions described above, Palo Alto Networks includes
as well functions like:
• Powerful routing fundament with RIP, OSPF and BGP
• Traffic shaping and policing
• Zone based architecture
• Virtualization
• Site-to-site IPSec VPN
• SSL VPN for remote access
2.2.2 Metasploit framework
The metasploit framework is a sub project of the open source Metasploit project,
and the metasploit project is known for anti forensics and evasions tools, which
is built into the framework.[20] The framework is a tool for developing and ex-
ecuting exploit code against a remote target computer.
Some of the most known exploits can be found in the metasploit frame-
work. It can be used by security researchers to find potential vulnerabilities,
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but it can also be used by cyber criminals to break into systems.[21] When used
by security researchers, vulnerabilities in systems can be found and fixed.
From the version 3.0, the metasploit framework have started to include
fuzzing tools, which discover software vulnerabilities, rather than writing ex-
ploits for currently public bugs. The framework is run by first choosing and
configuring an exploit, checking whether the intended target system is sus-
ceptible to the chosen exploit, choosing the encoding technique to encode the
payload so that the intrusion prevention system (IPS) will not catch the en-
coded payload, and executing the exploit.[20] The possibility to combine any
exploit with any payload is a major advantage, since it facilitates the tasks of
attackers, exploit writers and payload writers.
When choosing an exploit and payload, one need information about the
target system. Nmap is a tool that can get information about operating system
version and installed network services, and nessus is a tool that can detect
vulnerabilities.
2.3 Literature
Since intrusion detection system were invented in the middle of the 1980’s,
a lot of different intrusion intrusion detection systems have been developed,
different methods to detect malicious traffic, different algorithms and other
approaches as well. Intrusion detection systems use two different approaches
to detect malicious traffic, which are signature based detection and anomaly
detection.
Signature based detection is when the intrusion detection system uses a
database with signatures of known malicious traffic, and compare these sig-
natures against the traffic and see if there is some matches. If these signatures
match any traffic on the network, alerts are created. Anomaly detection would
detect statistical anomalies in the network traffic. The idea behind anomaly de-
tection is to create a ”baseline” that defines what kind of traffic that are deemed
normal, while traffic that is outside this baseline are looked as malicious traffic
and alerts are created.
The key advantage of signature detection is that signatures are easy to de-
velop and understand if you know what network behavior you are trying to
identify. The events generated by a signature based IDS can give you detailed
information about what caused the alert. Signature based rules are based on
pattern matching, and with modern day systems pattern matching can be per-
formed very quickly. This is very important for multi-gigabit IDS systems.
One can easily tweak signature based rulesets.
Since signature based IDS only can detect malicious traffic with known
signatures, malicious with not known signatures will not be discovered. So
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called 0-day attacks cannot be detected by a signature based IDS. And the
more signatures there are in the database, the slower will the detection engine
be. As well, signature based IDS will create many false positives since they
are usually based on regular expressions and string matching. Since they are
based on pattern matching, they don’t work well against different variants of
the attacks as well.
Anomaly detection has the ability to detect 0-day attacks, if it falls out of
the baseline that is set. It works very good against IRC based botnets and other
malicious activity. It creates lower amount of false positives than the signature
based IDS, and anomaly based IDS is very scalable, due to its architecture and
method of operation. There is no need for creating new signatures for every
attack and variant.
The disadvantage is that the anomaly detection engine is not able to decode
and process the network protocols being analyzed in order to understand its
goal and the payload. This is computationally expensive. In addition, there is
very difficult to defined anomaly based rules, as every protocol analyzed by
the system must be defined, base-lined and tested for precise thresholds. Most
network protocols are implemented in a different way by different operating
systems. As well, custom protocols needs to be analyzed, reverse engineered
and require a lot of effort. Malicious activity which falls under normal usage
pattern won’t be detected by the anomaly engine.
Anomaly based IDS is the most researched method of these two. The sig-
nature based IDS are all about creating signatures of malicious activity, but
anomaly detection has the strength of detect 0-day attacks, and all other mali-
cious activity if the baseline is optimal. There is not so much one can improve
by the signature based IDS, since is only uses signatures. While anomaly based
IDS can be configured to stop all kinds of attacks, especially new malware.
There are different methods within the signature based and anomaly based
IDS that can be improved. The high amount of data on the high speed net-






When comparing Snort, Bro and Suricata, one have to decide what kind of
information there are possible to compare. There are many things that could
be compared, such as output logs, alarms, configuration, ruleset, how to set
them up, and test environment.
Snort and Suricata can be used with some of the same rules, but this is not
done. Snort have been set to use the subscriber rules found at snort.org, while
Suricata uses rules from Emerging Threats. Bro has their own ruleset with
their own programming language.
Setting up Snort, Bro and Suricata were a time consuming process. Each of
them required a set of installed packages, which helps them in the process of
detecting malicious activity, and logging information about them.
The three intrusion deteciton systems were installed on the same machine,
and not on different computers. The operating system were Debian Lenny,
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This switch controls the 128.39.73.0/24 network. There are over 100 ma-
chines connected to this network, and when traffic are mirrored from the main
port, which is port 16, to port 2 (mirror port on the picture), traffic from 100
machines are mirrored.
The machine where Snort, Bro and Suricata are installed, have the IP ad-
dress ’128.39.73.9’ and the hostname ’jonas.vlab.iu.hio.no’. This machine is
connected to port 2 on the switch, and receives traffic from this port.
Snort, Bro and Suricata were installed at jonas.vlab.iu.hio.no with the needed
packages (see installation guide in appendix). The goal is to make Snort, Bro
and Suricata analyze the same traffic, and compare them based on the logs
created. Two approaches are described below.
3.3 Approach 1
After having installed Snort, Bro and Suricata at the machine jonas.vlab.iu.hio.no,
and finding out how to run each of them, they were ready to run.
There are two ways of making the three intrusion detection systems ana-
lyze the same traffic. By running them at the same time against the interface
that receives traffic from the switch, or by capturing traffic into a file by run-
ning tcpdump against the interface. Both methods were used.
1. Run Snort, Bro and Suricata against interface 2
How they are run are shown in appendix
2. Run tcpdump agains interface 2
How tcpdump are run are show in the appendix
When the three intrusion detection create alarms and logs about the traffic
either when run at the same time or against the tcpdump file, one can find out
what kind of alarms that were triggered and compare these alarms. One could
also compare other logs than the alarm logs, which Suricata and Bro creates.
One is often talking about ’true positives’ and ’false positive’ regarding
intrusion detection systems. This is something that also can be compared. As
well, the alarms created from Snort, Bro and Suricata differs, and there are no
simple way to compare them.
• True positive: An intrusion or attack has occured and an alarm have been
triggered
• False positive: an alarm have been triggered, but the traffic is legitimate
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A problem with intrusion detection systems are that they create to many
false positives. This leads to more work for the system administrator to find
the real threats, which needs to be stopped.
If this approach does not work, there is a backup plan where tcpdump is
run and capture traffic over several days. If this approach is needed, the plan
is to run it for four or five days, to get enough traffic to analyze. Each of the
three intrusion detection systems will be run against this tcpdump file, and
will produce logs and alarms out from this file. Tcdump will save the captured
traffic in binary with this command:
3.4 Approach 2
Running Snort, Bro and Suricata at the same time over time, or running them
against a tcpdump file that have capture traffic over some days, one will get
a lot of alarms to analyze. Many of these alarms are probably false positives,
which makes the analyzing part time consuming.
Another way to compare Snort, Bro and Suricata, is to test them against
Mestasploit Framework, which is exploits that can run be against the machine.
The Metasploit Framework contains some of the most well known attacks,
and by running different exploits against the machine where Snort, Bro and
Suricata are installed, it will create alarms based on the exploits that is run. As
the alarms are based on the traffic from the exploits, false positives will not
occur because there are known attacks that is run. The Metasploit Framework
were installed at a Ubuntu partition on the laptop.
Analyzing the traffic from the exploits sent by the Metasploit framework
can be done in two ways. The first way is to connect the laptop directly to the
machine where Snort, Bro and Suricata are installed, create a private network





















The second way to run the Metasploit Framework, is to run it through the
network. By connecting a network cable to the laptop as it were problems with
the wireless at the Ubuntu partition, and directing the traffic against the IP of
jonas.vlab.iu.hio.no machine (128.39.73.9), the exploits were send towards the
machine.
In both these ways, the traffic were captured by tcpdump into a file. The
tcpdump file that captured the traffic when connecting directly to the machine
ended with a size of 1.5 MB, while running tcpdump when the exploits were
run three times through the network towards the machine, ended with a size of
14 MB. How the Metasploit Framework were run, are shown in the appendix.
Steps of how to run Metasploit framework:
1. Open ports on the target machine (jonas.vlab.iu.hio.no) with netcat.
2. Create a database in postgres (shown in appendix)
3. Entering the msfconsole and load the created database
4. Run nmap scan against 128.39.73.9 (jonas.vlab.iu.hio.no)
5. Information about the nmap scan gets saved in the database
6. Run metasploit with autopwn. (Shown in appendix)
At the same as starting running the exploits, tcpdump is set to capture traf-
fic. After the exploits were finished running, tcpdump were stopped. Snort,





The first approach was to run Snort, Bro and Suricata at the same time, in a way
that they could analyze the same traffic. They were started at the same time
and was set to run. After running for some time, it looked like they were not
able to run simultaneously. Therefore tcpdump were used to capture traffic,
and were set to run four days. The file ended with a size of 40 GB, and the
three IDSs were run agains this file.
Taking the time of how long each of them uses to analyze the captured traf-
fic in the tcpdump file, is one way to compare the different intrusion detection
engines. By typing ’time’ in front of each command, the time would show after
they finish running against the tcpdump file.
After running each of them against the tcpdump file, the results showed
that:
• Bro used 27 minutes and 51 seconds
• Snort used 53 minutes and 19 seconds
• Suricata used 4 hours, 44 minutes and 37 seconds
Since Suricata were significantly slower, it was run against the tcpdump
file again, to make sure that there was nothing wrong with the first test. The
second result showed that Suricata used 4 hours, 47 minutes and 18 seconds.
4.1.1 Snort
Snort’s output module can be configured in several ways. The default is log-
ging in decoded ASCII format and full alerts. The other logs can be added with
different options when running snort. There are seven alert modes available
at the command line: full, fast, socket, syslog, console, cmg and none. Six of
these modes are accessed with the -A command line.
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The ’fast alert’ mode writes the alert in simple format with a timestamp,
alert message, source and destination IP’s and ports. The full alert mode is
the default mode and will be used automaically if you do not specify a mode.
Unsonck mode sends alert to a UNIX socket that another program can listen
on. -A none turns off alerting, -A console sends alert to the screen, and -A
generates cmg style alerts. Even though Snort has the possibility to log in
different ways, the full alert mode is the one that is used.
When running Snort against the tcpdump file with a size of 40 GB, it pro-
duced an ASCII file with an size of 128 MB, while the full alerts file were 124
MB.
Below is an example of some alerts created by Snort out from the tcpdump
file:
[1:402:8] ICMP Destination Unreachable Port Unreachable
[Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3]
04/15-14:51:09.916383 128.39.73.188 -> 128.39.74.66
ICMP TTL:64 TOS:0xC0 ID:993 IpLen:20 DgmLen:102
Type:3 Code:3 DESTINATION UNREACHABLE: PORT UNREACHABLE
** ORIGINAL DATAGRAM DUMP:
128.39.74.66:53 -> 128.39.73.188:37617
UDP TTL:63 TOS:0x0 ID:31313 IpLen:20 DgmLen:74
Len: 46 Csum: 54021
(46 more bytes of original packet)
** END OF DUMP
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2005-0068]
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2004-0790]
[1:15306:6] WEB-CLIENT Portable Executable binary file transfer
[Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3]
04/15-14:51:16.064884 158.38.122.10:80 -> 128.39.73.103:1033
TCP TTL:58 TOS:0x0 ID:52116 IpLen:20 DgmLen:1500 DF
***A**** Seq: 0xACD5E21 Ack: 0xF5214E13 Win: 0x1920 TcpLen: 20
[1:384:5] ICMP PING
[Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3]
04/15-14:51:30.225405 189.103.172.151 -> 128.39.73.79
ICMP TTL:107 TOS:0x20 ID:54713 IpLen:20 DgmLen:28
Type:8 Code:0 ID:1144 Seq:16225 ECHO
[119:19:1] (http_inspect) LONG HEADER
[Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2]
04/15-14:51:45.380352 128.39.73.51:51320 -> 65.55.57.252:80
TCP TTL:127 TOS:0x0 ID:1990 IpLen:20 DgmLen:1500 DF
***A**** Seq: 0xE8B6E47A Ack: 0x30ADE2F3 Win: 0xFAF0 TcpLen: 20
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• Source and destination IP
• Source and destination port
• Protocols involved
By performing some cat, grep and wc -l commands, one can find informa-
tion about how many alarms that were produced, what kind of priority that
appear most and how many times a specific alarm occurred.
• Total alerts: 408 390
• Alerts with priority 1: 144 475
• Alerts with priority 2: 118 855
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• Alerts with priority 3: 145 062
Some of the alarms occurred quite often in the alert file. Two of the alarms
were produced significantly more than the others, and that were ’Shellcode
x86’ and ’ICMP PING’. They occurred 137 156 and 90 029 times.
The ’Http inspect’ alarm occurred 21 752 times in the alert file, the ’Con-
secutive TCP small segments’ alarm occurred 29 170, and ’bad segment’ were
found 33 952 times. The two last alarms listed above, ’ICMP destination un-
reachable’ and ’web-client portable executable’ occured respectively 5358 and
244 times.
What does the different alerts mean? By looking up the snort id [22], one
can get a summary of the specific alert. Information about snort id, summary,
impact, detailed information, affected systems, attack scenarios, ease of attack,
false positive, false negative, corrective action, contributors and additional ref-
erences can be found.
For example looking up the alert message ’ICMP Destination Unreachable
Port Unreachable’, the ’detailed information’ about this alert tells that it is not
an attack, but may indicate that the source of the packet was the target of a scan
or other malicious activity. An ICMP Port Unreachable indicates that someone
or something tried to connect to a port on a system that was not available.
28
4.1. APPROACH 1
By looking up the id to one of the ’Shellcode x86’ alerts [22], for example
’SHELLCODE x86 inc ecx NOOP’ with sid 1:269, it shows that this event is
generated when an attempt is made to possibly overflow a buffer.
The alarm message ’WEB-CLIENT Portable Executable binary file trans-
fer’ indicates that a portable executable has been downloaded. And it can
affect all Windows systems. The alarm message ’(http inspect) long header’
is generated when the http inspect preprocessor detects anomalous network
traffic. In particular, the preprocessor has detected a long client header in an
http request.
’ICMP PING’ is generated when an generic ICMP echo request is made.
An ICMP echo is used by the ping command to elicit an ICMP echo reply
from a listening live host. This rule alerts on a generic ICMP request where
no payload is included in the message or the payload not match more specific
rules.
The ’Bad segment’ are generated when the stream5 preprocessor detects
anomalous network traffic. The preprocessor has detected a bad segment,
the overlap adjusted size is less than or equal to 0 [22]. Information about
the alarm ’Consecutive TCP small segments exceeding threshold’ could not be
found.
4.1.2 Bro
After running Bro against the tcpdump file, it produced 66 log files, where
12 of them were unique. 11 of them created 6 logs, while the alarm log were
created five times, and there were one debug log. In addition to the alarm
log and debug log, the ’conn log’, ’ftp log’, ’http log’, ’irc log’, ’notice log’,
’signatures log’, ’smtp log’, ’software log’, ’step log’ and ’weird log’ got created
as well.
There were not all logs that contained information, even though they were
created. Those who contained information after being run against the tcp-
dump file, were ’alarm log’, ’conn log’, ’ftp log’, ’http log’, ’notice log’, ’smtp
log’ and ’weird log’. The most important or useful logs are the ’alarm log’,
’conn log’, ’notice log’ and ’http log’.









p=4899/tcp num=20 msg=61.176.193.197\ has\








scanned\ a\ total\ of\ 183\ hosts tag=@13-2594-26a3e









The first alert showed above, tells you that the time of the alert is Sunday
17 April 2011 23:53:48 GMT. The notice shows that the alert is a port scan from
the IP 212.174.139.12, and there have ben scanned a total of 31 ports. And by
looking up this IP, one find out that this IP is from Turkey.
Alarm log sums up the different alerts in a summary, rather than logging
each alert many times. When some of the summaries shows that several ports
or hosts has been scanned, it gather this in one alert instead of printing many
of the same alert.
The alarm log gives a summary of different scans, such as scan summary,
portscan summary, address scan, and shutdown threshold.
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ScanSummary tells how many hosts that have been scanned. Each of the
ScanSummay contains information about how many hosts that has been scanned,
and in one scan there could from 20 to 250 hosts scanned. The same applies to
PortScanSummary, only how many ports scanned are shown in each summary.
In each PortScanSummary there could be between 20 to 200 ports scanned.
AddressScan gives the same information as ScanSummary. It sums up how
many hosts that have been scanned in each alarm created in the alarm log. The
ShutdownThresh messsage tells how many times the connection have been
terminated after a host have been scanned more than specified in the thresh-
old.
The next log is the ’conn log’, which shows all connections between hosts.
The columns in this log are the time of the connection, the duration of the con-
nection in seconds, local IP, remote IP, protocol, original bytes sent, response
bytes sent, state, flags and tag. Some examples of the alarms are shown below.
Connection log:
1303077589.720744 7.042941 128.39.73.124
93.188.134.13 http 2934 80 tcp 500 301 RSTO X %299213
1303077588.625408 8.138393 128.39.73.124




195.88.55.16 http 2926 80 tcp 6887 3657 RSTO X %299205
The first connection above tells that the time of the connection was Sun-
day 17 April 2001 at 21:59:49 and the duration of the connection was about 7
seconds. The local IP is 128.39.73.124 and remote IP is 93.88.134.13, and the ser-
vice is http. RSTO X means that a connection is established and the originator
aborted.
Total connections, total http connections, ssh connections and smtp con-
nections are shown in the table below.
Total connections were 775 545, and 625 929 of these were http connections.
Total SSH and smtp connections were 81 328 and 39 352.
Notice log is the primary output facility in Bro. Information that can be










sa=208.115.210.210 p=1068/tcp num=20 msg=208.115.210.210\
has\ scanned\ 20\ hosts\ (1068/tcp) tag=@13-2594-15a
t=1302872098.424917 no=BackscatterSeen na=NOTICE_FILE
sa=184.172.158.211 p=53/tcp msg=backscatter\ seen\
from\ 184.172.158.211\ (20\ hosts;\ dns) tag=@13-2594-1a7
t=1302874127.196955 no=ScanSummary na=NOTICE_ALARM_ALWAYS
sa=63.221.156.117 num=110 msg=63.221.156.117\ scanned\
a\ total\ of\ 110\ hosts tag=@13-2594-5ee
The notice ’AddressScan’ tells that several addresses at the network has
been scanned from another machine, while BackscatterSeen is apparently flood-
ing seen from source. ScanSummary is a summary of a scan activity.
The first ’notice’ from the notice log listed above, tells in UNIX time that
the time were Friday 15 April 2001, 12:54:15, and the notice action was ’notice
alarm always’. Source address were 208.115.210.210, source port 1068/tcp, and
it tells that 20 host have been scanned.
The table below shows the total alerts in the notice log, and two of the
alarm messages that occured most.
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The total amount of alerts in the notice log were 98 584, and 31 621 of them
showed the message ’OfflineResourceStats’ which tells how many events that
is queued. ’WeirdActivity’ message tells that there is packets with no IPv4
included. Rest of messages in the notice log are listed in the next table. There
were 66 023 WeirdActiviy messages.
The message ’TRWScanSummary’ occurred 667 times, and this message is
a summary of scanning activities reported by TRW. ’BackScatterseen’ is flood-
ing attempts, and have been reported 45 times. ’AddressScan’ and ’PortScan-
Summary tells how many hosts and ports that has been scanned. AdressScan
are listed 79 times, while PortScanSummary are listed 71 times in the notice
log.
Each ScanSummary notice gives information about how many hosts that
have been scanned, which usually are between 20-250 hosts.
The ftp analyzer generates summaries of ftp sessions; looks for sensitive
usernames, access to sensitive files, and possible fpt bounce attacks, in which
the host specified in a port does not correspond to the host sending the direc-
tive.
Here is an example of a ftp session:
1303142310.223106 #3 128.39.73.55/12613 > 217.69.76.55/ftp start
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1303142310.338454 #3 response (220 Service ready for new user.)
1303142310.338913 #3 USER anonymous/-wget@ (logged in)
1303142310.416644 #3 SYST (215 UNIX)
1303142310.455136 #3 PWD (done)
1303142310.493927 #3 TYPE I (ok)
1303142310.532418 #3 CWD /gcrypt (ok)
1303142310.610500 #3 SIZE libgcrypt-1.4.2.tar.gz (unavail)
1303142310.648893 #3 PASV (227 217.69.76.55/40199)
1303142310.729969 #3 RETR libgcrypt-1.4.2.tar.gz (unavail)
1303142316.342856 #3 finish
These ftp sessionss tarts with a connection where the IP 128.39.73.55 on
port 12 613 connects to a a ftp server at IP 217.69.76.55. The ftp server response
and tell that 220 services are ready for the new user. Then anonymous user log
in to the system with password and the login is encrypted. Then the user try
to get libgcrypt-1.4.2.tar.gz but this package is unavailable. The user try one
more time, but still unavailable and the session finish.
The http log file shows the details from http streams. It contains a packet
epoch time and stream reference value for each entry. Lines contain stream
header summary information and content detail. This includes source and


















GET /search?q=beer+fong (200 "OK" [47954] www.google.no)
Each http request have a timestamp, and then the source IP and port, and
destination IP and port. The next line tells what the user search for, which in
the last http request above, are beer fong.
There were quite little information logged about smtp traffic. All smtp
traffic that were logged were:
SMTP log:
1303113966.698958 #1 128.39.73.30/45472
> 158.36.161.27/587 start external
1303113966.708262 #1 STARTTLS
Weird log were the last log containing any information about the traffic
captured in the tcpdump file. The weird log contains unusual events based
on the weird policy file. It represents packets that Bro consider suspicious for











In the Suricata configuration file ’suricata.yaml’ one can set Suricata to log into
different logs. The first log specified is the ’fast.log’, which is a line based alerts
log similar to Snorts ’fast.log’. Suricata can as well be set to log in a way that
it can be used by a program called Barnyard later, but this is not enabled. The
other logs that Suricata creates are the ’http.log’ which is a line based log of
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http requests. The ’alert-debug.log’ is a full alert log containing information
about suscpicious activity.
After running Suricata against the tcpdump file, it created four different
logs. These logs are alert-debug.log, fast.log, http.log and stats.log. The total
size of the alert-debug log was 40 MB, fast log was 11 MB, http log was 117
MB, and the stats log was 4 MB.
Information about the alarms created can be found in the alert-debug log
and fast log. The alert-debug log describes every alarm very specific, while
the fast log shows only the most important information about each alarm, and
gives a better overview of each alarm. Since they contain information about
the same alarms, results from fast log are shown since these alarms were sim-
pler to read and understand.
Useful information that can be found in the fast log, are timestamp, sid
number which tells which rule that has been triggered, alarm message, classi-
fication of the alarm, priority. IPs and ports involved, and two links were one
can find information about the alarm and which rule that triggered the alarm.
Three alarms from the fast log are shown below.
Fast log:
04/15/11-12:58:06.418709 [**] [1:2012204:3]
ET SCAN Modified Sipvicious Sundayddr Scanner [**]
[Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 3]





ET SCAN Potential SSH Scan [**]
[Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 3]






ET POLICY RDP disconnect request [**]
[Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3]






After reading the tcpdump file, Suricata created a total of 28 243 alarms in




In the fast log, there is created as many as 17 499 alarms that says ’Po-
tential SSH Scan’, and there are 6986 alarms which says ’Policy TeamViewer
keep-alive inbound’. The ’Policy TeamViewer keep-alive inbound’ message is
created because of a typo. The message in sid 2008795 which creates this alarm
has a typo: ’TeamVieweer’ should be ’TeamViewer’. SSH scan can be seen as
a brute force attempt, where many combinations of username and password
are tried to gain access.
39
4.1. APPROACH 1
The rest of the alarms in the fast log is listed in this graph. There are 483
alarms of ’Modified Sipvicious User-Agent detected’, 651 ’Basic auth base64’
alarms, 530 ’Likely BruteForce attack’ alarms, 41 ’Policy RDP connection re-
quest and 29 ’Policy RDP connection confirm’ alarms.
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Each alarm have a classification which tells what kind of category the alarm
belongs to. 19 991 alarms belonged to the classification ’Attempted informa-
tion leak’, while 7980 alarms belonged to the classificatopn ’Misc activity’. 652
of the alarms were potential corporate privacy violation, and it was 531 at-
tempts to gain administrator privilege.
The http log contain information about each http request, similar to Bro,
but contain some more information and are a bit more difficult to read. Each
http request shows a timestamp, which address that was requested, message,
and involved IP’s and ports. Examples are shown below.
04/15/11-12:51:02.068859 security.debian.org [**]
/dists/lenny/updates/Release [**]








/sdk/vimService?wsdl [**] <useragent unknown> [**]
128.39.28.174:80 -> 128.39.73.231:49632
The http log is created to show details from http streams. Aftersome there
are most malicious traffic on the web, there is useful to have the http log which
saves information about each http request. As well, the http requests can be
compared against the alarm found in the alert-debug log and fast log.
Stats log is the last log Suricata created. This log gather information about
how many packets, how many bytes, how many IPv4 and IPv6, how many tcp
and udp packets there are each eight second. Other information such as icmp
packets and average and max package size can be found as well. Below there







Counter | TM Name | Value
-------------------------------------------------------------------
decoder.pkts | Decode & Stream | 15314
decoder.bytes | Decode & Stream | 13947880
decoder.ipv4 | Decode & Stream | 15254
decoder.ipv6 | Decode & Stream | 2
decoder.ethernet | Decode & Stream | 15314
decoder.raw | Decode & Stream | 0
decoder.sll | Decode & Stream | 0
decoder.tcp | Decode & Stream | 15079
decoder.udp | Decode & Stream | 163
decoder.icmpv4 | Decode & Stream | 5
decoder.icmpv6 | Decode & Stream | 0
decoder.ppp | Decode & Stream | 0
decoder.pppoe | Decode & Stream | 0
decoder.gre | Decode & Stream | 0
decoder.vlan | Decode & Stream | 0
decoder.avg_pkt_size | Decode & Stream | 910.792739
decoder.max_pkt_size | Decode & Stream | 1514
defrag.ipv4.fragments | Decode & Stream | 4
defrag.ipv4.reassembled | Decode & Stream | 2
defrag.ipv4.timeouts | Decode & Stream | 0
defrag.ipv6.fragments | Decode & Stream | 0
defrag.ipv6.reassembled | Decode & Stream | 0
defrag.ipv6.timeouts | Decode & Stream | 0
tcp.sessions | Decode & Stream | 86
tcp.ssn_memcap_drop | Decode & Stream | 0




The second approach was to run Metasploit agains the machine where Snort,
Bro and Suricata were installed. After Metasploit had been installed, there
were two ways that Metasploit could be run. One could run Metasploit by
connecting directly to the machine by a twinned cable and create a private


















After running a nmap scan against the target machine, it gathered infor-
mation about which ports that were open, and saved this information to the
database that were created. By having this information, the Metasploit frame-
work could use another database containing exploits for different ports, to
send these exploits against those ports saved in the database from the nmap
scan.
To be sure that Snort, Bro and Suricata got the same traffic to analyze, tcp-
dump were run to capture the traffic from the Metasploit exploits sent towards
the target machine. The first test were the laptop were connected directly to
the target machine, tcpdump captured the traffic into a file, with ended with a
size of 1,5 MB after Metasploit exploits were finished running.
The second test where Metasploits were run through the network, the Metas-
ploit exploits were run three times to create a tcpdump file, and make Snort,
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Bro and Suricata to analyze more traffic than in the first test. The tcpdump file
ended with a size of 14 MB.
4.2.1 Snort
As in approach 1, Snort were set to log into the default ASCII and full alerts
file. But the results below are based on the full alerts file.
After going through the results from the first and second test with Metas-
ploit, it showed that some of the same alarms were triggered as in approach 1,
and there were some new alarms that did not appear in approach 1.
The results above shows the the total amount of alarms created after run-
ning Snort against the first tcpdump file that captured traffic from the Metas-
ploit attack. 125 alarms were created, 51 of them with priority 1, 16 with pri-
ority 2, and 58 with priority 3.
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This graph tells how many times each different alarm appeared in the full
alert file. There were only one ’WEB-IIS cmd.exe access’ alarm, any by looking
up at the snort id [22], one can find out that this event indicates an attempt to
exploit potential weaknesses in a host running Microsoft IIS.
There were 15 different ’RPC portmap’ alarms. The RPC message ’RPC
portmap Solaris sadmin port query udp request’ is an event generated when
an attempt is made to exploit known vulnerability in Solaris. This attack can
cause ’denial of service’, information disclosure, and loss of information in-
tegrity.
There were 50 ’Shellcode x86’ alarms, and this alarm is described in the
approach 1. Out from 125 alarms, 58 of them had the message ’ICMP Destina-
tion Unreachable Port Unreachable’. An ICMP port unreachable may indicate





After running the Metasploit exploits against the target machine three times,
capturing the traffic by tcpdump, and run Snort against this file, Snort created




There were six ’ICMP PING’ messages. An ICMP echo request is used by
the the ping command to elicit an ICMP echo reply from a listening live host.
It was 151 different ’SHELLCODE x86’ alarms, and 93 different RPC alarms.
The ’Reset outside window’ occur 51 times, and by looking up this alarms, it
seems that it is a false positive, which mean that there is legitimate traffic that
has been alarmed.
’Consecutive TCP small segments exceeding threshold’ appeared 259 times,




When connecting the laptop directly to the machine where Bro were installed,
the Metasploit were run against the machine, and the traffic were captured
by tcpdump into a file that ended with a size of 1,5 MB. After running Bro
against this tcpdump file, it created 12 different logs as before, but some of
them were empty. Those who were not empty, were ’alarm.log’, ’conn.log’,
’ftp.log’, ’http.log’, ’notice.log’ and ’weird.log’.
In the alarm log one can information about how many hosts and ports that




this alarm tells there were an attempt to gain administrator privilege
• PortScan
tells how many ports that has been scanned
a total of 300 ports were scanned
• LowPortTrolling
• PortScanSummary
tells how many ports that has been scanned
a total of 264 ports were scanned
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The connection log, log information about each connection. Timestamp,
duration of the connection, source and destination IP, which ports that is in-
volved and which protocol is logged.
Total connections in the connection log are 5781, and 5599 of the connec-
tions were rejected. Of the 5781 connections, 5273 of them dit not have any
specified name of the connection, as for example ftp or http or etc.
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The rest of the connections in the connection log are liste here. There were
a total of 340 netbios-ssn connections, 106 http connections, and 25 ftp connec-
tions. Total pm-getport connections were 8, it was 2 ssh connections, and 3
telnet connections.




cmd.exe x9WY.exe <no reply>
Some of the information that can be found in the notice log are similar to
the information found in the alarm log. In the notice log, one can find times-
tamp, notice (alarm message) and notice action. Rest of the information differ
because of the different alarms.
Alarms or notices listed in notice log:
• SensitivePortmapperAccess: 1 time
• OfflineResourceStats: 58 times
• PortScan: 2 times
• LowPortTrolling: 1 time
• ResourceSummary: 1 time
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• PortScanSummary: 1 time
The last log containing information from the first tcpdump file, is the weird
log. The weird log contains unusual events based on the weird policy. It rep-
resents packets that Bro consider suspicious.
1304592784.809614 10.0.0.2/47163 > 10.0.0.3/3000:
above_hole_data_without_any_acks
1304592788.899341 10.0.0.2/52588 > 10.0.0.3/http:
double_%_in_URI





The second Metasploit approach, were to run it through the network, and
capture the traffic with tcpdump and save it to a file. After running the same
exploits three times, the tcpdump file ended with a size of 14 MB.
After running Bro against this tcpdump file, it was only four of the 12 logs
that contained information. The logs with information was the ’alarm log’, the
’conn log’, and the ’weird log’.
The alarms or the scan summaries found in the alarm log after the second






Portscan and Portscan summary tells how many port that have been scanned.
Portscan shows that 300 ports have been scanned, while portscan summary
shows that 313 ports have been scanned.
Addresscan and scan summary tells how many hosts that have been scanned,
which are 20 hosts and 44 hosts.
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Total of connections are 8451, and 8008 of the connections dont have any
specified protocol used, as for example ssh, http and pm-getport that is shown
in the next graph. 1611 of the connections were aborted by the responder.
394 of the connections were related to ssh, 19 to http, and 24 to pm-getport.
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The same notices occured in this notice log as the previous approach:
• OfflineResourceStats: 120 times
• SensitivePortmapperAccess: 1 time
• PortScan: 3 times
• TRWScanSummary: 1 time
• ScanSummary: 3 times
• PortScanSummary: 1 time
In the weird log there is four weird messages, where the IP of the laptop
tried to connect on the port 3000 on the target machine from different ports.












When running Suricata against the first tcpdump file, there were no alerts pro-
duced in the alert-debug.log or the fast.log. The http log and stats.log con-
tained only a few lines about some http requests and some information about
the packets in the tcpdump file.
Six http request were found in the http log, and in the stats log there were








Counter | TM Name | Value
-------------------------------------------------------------------
decoder.pkts | Decode & Stream | 13100
decoder.bytes | Decode & Stream | 1267871
decoder.ipv4 | Decode & Stream | 12933
decoder.ipv6 | Decode & Stream | 0
decoder.ethernet | Decode & Stream | 13100
decoder.raw | Decode & Stream | 0
decoder.sll | Decode & Stream | 0
decoder.tcp | Decode & Stream | 12709
decoder.udp | Decode & Stream | 163
decoder.icmpv4 | Decode & Stream | 58
decoder.icmpv6 | Decode & Stream | 0
decoder.ppp | Decode & Stream | 0
decoder.pppoe | Decode & Stream | 0
decoder.gre | Decode & Stream | 0
decoder.vlan | Decode & Stream | 0
decoder.avg_pkt_size | Decode & Stream | 96.784046
decoder.max_pkt_size | Decode & Stream | 1514
defrag.ipv4.fragments | Decode & Stream | 75
defrag.ipv4.reassembled | Decode & Stream | 3
defrag.ipv4.timeouts | Decode & Stream | 0
defrag.ipv6.fragments | Decode & Stream | 0
defrag.ipv6.reassembled | Decode & Stream | 0
defrag.ipv6.timeouts | Decode & Stream | 0
tcp.sessions | Decode & Stream | 5767
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tcp.ssn_memcap_drop | Decode & Stream | 0




After running Suricata against the second tcpdump file, which contained
traffic from three Metasploit exploits attack, it produced some alarms in the
alert-debug log.
The same alarms can be found in the alert-debug log and the fast log. The
results below are gathered from the fast log.
In the fast log one can find information, such as timestamp, such as times-
tamp, rule id, alarm message, alarm classification, which IPs and ports in-
volved, some information about the alarm, and link to rule that triggered this
specific alarm.
Suricata produced 45 alarms after reading the second tcpdump file. Of
these 45 alarms were 38 of them potential SSH scan alarms, and 7 were poten-
tial VNC scans. These were the only two alarms Suricata created.
Some http requests from the second Metasploit test is listed below.
05/06/11-15:51:09.620756 128.39.73.9 [**]
/pajax/pajax/pajax_call_dispatcher.php [**]
<useragent unknown> [**] 128.39.75.86:38497
-> 128.39.73.9:3000
05/06/11-16:02:32.273314 128.39.73.9 [**]
/ [**] Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0;
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[**] <useragent unknown> [**]
128.39.75.86:48796 -> 128.39.73.9:3000
05/06/11-16:03:41.934284 128.39.73.9 [**]
/ [**] <useragent unknown> [**] 128.39.75.86:55400
-> 128.39.73.9:3000
The stats log holds information about how many packets, bytes, how many





The installation and configuration turned out to be very time consuming. Dur-
ing the installation and configuration, different errors and problems appeared,
and one of the intrusion detection systems (IDS) were more troublesome than
the others.
Following an installation guide of how to install Snort, Bro and Suricata
brought more problems than expeceted. During the installation of the different
packages and libraries, and while including them for the different IDSs, differ-
ent errors appeared mostly because some libraries or packages were missing
and needed to be installed.
The results from the two approaches used, are going to be analyzed and
discussed. As well, some different choices that have been made, and some
improvements for the different IDSs will be explained.
After running Snort, Bro and Suricata for a period of time, they were stopped
because it looked they were not able to run simultaneously. Therefore, tcp-
dump was used to capture traffic into a file, which Snort, Bro and Suricata
could be run against. This applies to both approaches.
At a later point, when trying to run Snort, Bro and Suricata at the same
time, it turned out to be that this approch works. But after using tcpdump, not
any new tests were done by this approach. Tcpdump were stopped after four
days because of the disk space were limited.
The first Metasploit test created a tcpdump file of 1.5 MB, which were a
little bit low. At the second Metasploit test the Metasploit exploits were run
three times in order to create a larger tcpdump file, and more traffic to analyze.




5.2.1 Installation and configuration
Including the needed packages into Snort, gave some different types of prob-
lems. Dnet header not found and problem with PCRE were two problems that
occurred. Finding the right solution for the dnet took some time, since libd-
net and libnet were already installed and it should have been working. After
spending quite some time on this problem, a solution were found:
LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/usr/local/lib
export LD_LIBRARY_PATH
These two commands had to be run at each login to the machine, and in-
stead of doing this, the two commands were added to the /root/.bashrc file,
which are run automatically at each login.
The issue with dnet, was that the path to were libdnet are installed (/usr/local/lib/)
is not in the shared path used by Snort. After troubling with this problem, a
problem with PCRE appeared. It turned out to be some problems with the
newest version, and an older version was installed. The rest of the process
went without any further problems.
By following the installation guide, it was straight forward to install Snort,
if looking away from the ’dnet header not found’ problem. This were the only
problem that took some time.
5.2.2 Approach 1
It took Snort 53 minutes and 19 seconds to read through the tcpdump file of
40 GB, and create alarms based on the traffic in the file. Snort were set only
to log in the default logs, which were in ASCII format and full alerts. Snort
produced as many as 408 390 alarms, which is a quite large amount of alarms
after analyzing traffic from four days. By looking at the different alarms in the
full alert file, there were many of the same alarms that were triggered many
times.
By finding how many times each each alarm occur in the alert file, and
finding out what each of the alarm means, one can see if there are some false
positives and if the amount of them can be reduced by setting a threshold.
The total amount of ICMP PING were 90 029, and an ICMP PING are used
to determine live hosts in the network. The information from the ping can be
used by an attacker in prior to launching attacks. A simple ping are innocent
in it self, since it does not do any harm. But the information from the ping,
can be used further in an attack. If this message appear many times, it is likely
that someone is trying to find live hosts in your network, and one should set
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a limit of how many times somebody can send an ICMP PING within a time
period.
The alarm message ’Shellcode x86’ occurred 137 156 times, and by look-
ing up the sid (snort id) of ’SHELLCODE x86 inc ecx NOOP’, one can see the
amount of false positives are quite high. The corrective action to this alarm,
is to apply a non-executable user stack patch to your kernel. Secure program-
ming/execution of a program check the destination host and service to verify
if any buffer overflow vulnerability exists. [22].
One could limit the amount of ’ICMP PING’ and ’Shellcode x86’ alarms by
filtering in the threshold.conf file. This could be done in three different ways:
1. Limit: Alert each alarm only once
2. Threshold: Alert only once during a time period
3. Both above
An example could be to create one ’ICMP PING’ alarm each minute. If
there are more than one ’ICMP PING’ alarm triggered within a minute, there
will still be only logged one alarm.
’Bad segment’ alarms are signs of anomalous traffic. This alarm is triggered
by traffic that is outside the preset baseline that describes what kind of traffic
that is considered normal. The message do not tell what kind of traffic that
occured, only that it was outside this preset baseline. This baseline are rules
which desribes what is considered anomalous traffic in the preprocessor files.
A port scan is run to find out what kind of ports is open on a system.
An example of a portscan tool is nmap. When there are no services on the
ports that have been scanned, Snort create an alarm message which says ’ICMP
Destination Unreachable Port Unreachable’. A portscan are often used by an
attacker to find which ports that are open on a host or server, and to use this
information to attack the service on the open ports.
5.2.3 Approach 2
Metasploit was tested in two different ways; laptop directly connected to the
target machine, and through the network. When using this two different meth-
ods, nmap had to be run two times since the IP address were different in the
two tests.
• Test 1: IP address were 10.0.0.3
• Test 2: IP address were 128.39.73.9
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After running nmap against each of them, different exploits were listed. In
the first test there were listed as many as 347 exploits, while at the second test
there were listed 127 exploits.
After running Snort against the first tcpdump file, it created 125 alarms.
Knowing that there were sent 347 exploits towards the machine, it showed that
Snort detected around 36 per cent of them, which are very low. By looking in
the msfconsole log, it showed that not all exploits were run.
’ICMP Destination Unreachable Port Unreachable’ tells that there have been
a port scan. A port scan are used to find out which ports that is open. Nor-
mally there is run some services on the open ports, and knowing this informa-
tion can be useful for an attacker. Since 58 of the alarms were alarmed with
this message, it shows that 58 of the exploits failed.
A disadvantage with this message, is that it do not tell what kind of ex-
ploits that have been sent against the machine. The exploits in the Metasploit
framework are made to exploit a vulnerability in a service run at the target
machine. When there are no services on those ports these exploits are trying
to attack, the exploits are aborted or stopped.
The RPC portmap alarms shows that there have been different attempts
to exploit known vulnerabilities in Solaris, denial of service attempts, and at-
tempt to discover which port that runs cmsd. This shows that some of the
exploits sent from Metasploit triggered some alarms at Snort.
The different ’RPC portmap’ alarms are portscans, attempts of to gain ad-
ministrator privilege and denial of service attacks. Here have Snort discovered
some of the exploits sent towards the machine. One could look at the exploits
that have been run towards the machine, and see if one could find which of
the exploits that have been triggered with ’RPC portmap’ message. This is
unfortunately not done.
After running Snort against the second tcpdump file containing traffic from
the Metasploit exploits, it created 752 alarms. Still there were many alarms in
the full alert file with the message ’ICMP destination unreachable port un-
reachable’.
5.3 Bro
5.3.1 Installation and configuration
The process of installing and finding out how to run Bro, were more time con-
suming than wanted. The first problem that appeared when installing Bro,
were that automake and libtool were not installed. After installing these two
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packages, the next problem appeared, which said the three packages libnu-
curses, libssl and libmagic had to be installed. Most of the packages are listed
in the installation guide, but the problems appeared before using this guide.
When the problem with libpcap occurred, it was not because it had not
been installed, but because that the version installed were not compatible with
Bro. Therefore another version had to be installed. The last problem that ap-
peared with installing Bro, was the PCRE package. It turned out to be some
problems with the newest version, so an older version were installed.
After fixing all the problems during the installation, Bro finally got in-
stalled. By looking at the installation guide, it said that Bro was run like this:
bro.rc start from where this file is located. When trying to run Bro in this way,
the error message ’mkdir: cannot create directory’ appeared. The solution to
this was to install brolite and broctl, and run Bro with this command com-
mand: broctl start.
The installation of brolite lead to that three configuration files were in-
stalled in the /usr/local/bro/etc folder. This configuration files were the net-
works.cfg which told which network to run at, node.cfg which told which
interface to run against, and broctl.cfg which told which rules that were in-
cluded.
The last details that needed to be done to make Bro work, was that the
bro.cfg had to be copied from /usr/src/bro-1.5.3/scripts to usr/local/bro/etc,
and the bro.rc-hoosk.sh had to be copied from /usr/local/src/bro-cvs/bro-
1.5.3.cvs/scripts to /usr/local/bro/etc. After this was done, Bro finally were
able to run.
5.3.2 Approach 1
It took Bro 27 minutes and 51 seconds to read through the 40 GB tcpdump file.
This is almost half the time of what Snort used. If only looking at this result,
Bro has a detection engine that is twice as powerful as the Snort engine. When
looking at the alarms created, there were a total of 95 584 alarms in the notice
log, which are little bit under a quarter of the total alarms Snort created.
When looking in the different logs created by Bro, there are very little infor-
mation about specific malicious activity compared to Snort. The closest are the
address scan summaries and port scan summaries in the alarm log and notice
log. Here one find summaries of how many ports and hosts that have been
scanned. Information about different alarms such as ’ICMP PING’, ’Bad Seg-
ment’, ’Shellcode x86’ that are found by Snort, are not found in the different
Bro logs.
Instead of finding and logging information about potential threats in one
file such as Snort, Bro seperates the traffic into different files based on what
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kind of traffic there is. All http requests get logged in the http log, all connec-
tions are logged in the conn log and all ftp traffic are logged in the ftp log. Bro
creates a total of 12 different logs, and it can be time consuming to go through
all this logs to look for malicious activity. But a positive thing with seperating
the different traffic into different logs, is that if one wants to look at ftp or smtp
traffic, there is made own logs for this kind of traffic.
5.3.3 Approach 2
After running Bro against the first tcpdump file containing traffic from 347
exploits sent against the target machine, Bro created 12 logs as usual, but only
6 of them containing some information about the traffic. By looking in the
alarm log, the summary of portscan showed that 300 ports had been scanned.
Knowing that there were sent 347 exploits towards the machine, and that some
of the exploits failed to run, it shows that Bro probably registrated all or most
of the exploits that were sent.
By looking at the other logs created, such as the connection log one can see
that there were 5781 connections made by the 347 exploits. This means that
each exploit sent many connections requests to the different ports.
When running Bro against the second file containing traffic from the Metas-
ploit exploits, Bro detected that 300 ports were scanned. And in the connection
log there were registrated 8451 connections from the exploits.
5.4 Suricata
5.4.1 Installation and configuration
Installing Suricata with the needed packages, were straight forward. After
learning from the problems and mistakes when installing Snort and Bro, it
was just following the installation guide. The only process that took some
time, were downloading the different rules from Emerging Threats [23].
5.4.2 Approach 1
Suricata were set to log into four different logs. After being run against the 40
GB tcpdump file, detailed information about each alarm where logged in the
alert-debug log, information about each alarm in fast log, http request were
logged in the http log, and statistics are logged in the stats log.
Suricata created a total of 28 243 alarms out from the tcpdump file, which
are quite lower than both Snort and Bro. This are probably a more realistic




The total of potential ssh scans were as high as 17 499. A SSH scan alarm get
triggered when different usernames and password are tried quite frequently
against port 22. Suricata can limit the amount of potential ssh scan by setting
a limit of how many times a username and a password can be tried within a
period. If nothing is set, as in this case, all ssh login attempts will be registrated
as potentially ssh scan.
The TeamViewer alarm have been triggered 6986 times, and are created
because of a typo. ’TeamVieweer’ should be ’TeamViewer’. By looking up
this alarm message, there are quite little information about it. So if the alarm
is just a typo, then this traffic are looked as harmless and as a false positive.
But in some cases, TeamViewer can be used in Social engineering, by tricking
someone to download the program, and get remote access to their machines.
Rest of the alarms appeared not as many times as those two above. The
’Modified Sipvicious user-agent detected’ alarm were listed 483 times, while
total different ’Modified Sipvicious’ alarms were 966. This message can mean
different things, such as ssh scan, that a worm has been detected and port scan,
which means that this alarm have to be taken serious.
At the end of each alarm in the fast log, one can find links to different web
sites where information about the alarm can be found. This is similar to Snort’s
ability to look up different Snort IDs.
The ’Policy RPD’ alarms shows different port scans, and there are not so
many of them. Port scan are used to locate services on servers or host. If ser-
vices are found at ports, the attacker will try attack and exploit a vulnerability
on this port to gain access to the system, which is not wanted by those who
run these services.
The message ’Likely BruteForce attack’ are related to the potential ssh scan
message. Brute force is when many different combinations of keys are tried to
break in or gain access to a system. The ’Attempted administrator privilege
gain’ are related to the potential ssh scan as well.
The stats log are useful if one want to find out how many packets that have
been processed, how many of them were IPv4 and IPv6, which protocols and
further. Else, there are nothing specific information about malicious activity,
as one can find in the fast log.
5.4.3 Approach 2
Suricata produced no alarms after running against the first tcpdump file con-
taining traffic from the 347 exploits. None of the rules were triggered after
reading the tcpdump file. This was very odd, since Snort produced 125 alarms
from the same file, and Bro registrated that 300 ports were scanned. It could
be that the ruleset that were used, were not good enough, but the solution to
why Suricata did not produce any alarms remain unknown.
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After running Suricata against the second tcpdump file containing traffic
from Metasploit, 45 alarms were triggered. Compared to Snort and Bro this
number of alarms were quite low. 37 of these alarms were SSH scans, and 7 of
them were ’ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5900-5920 ’ which told that some of
the exploits tried to break in through vnc.
5.5 Conclusion
5.5.1 Installation and configuration
During the installation of Snort, Bro and Suricata, the one that turned out to
be the easiest to install and configure, were Suricata. By following the instal-
lation guide, Suricata were installed with the needed packages. Snort and Bro
encountered some problems during the installation process. Different pack-
ages that were either missing, packages that were not compatible, or it turned
out to be wrong version installed. Bro were clearly the one that brought most
problems during the installation. Just finding out how to run Bro, were a time
consuming process, since the normal way to run Bro did not work.
5.5.2 Approach 1 and 2
Running Snort, Bro and Suricata against traffic captured by tcpdump, showed
some huge differences in the amount of alarms created. In the first approach,
Snort created four times as many alarms than Bro, and over 14 times as many
alarms as Suricata.
Snort created over 400 000 alarms after reading the tcpdump file of 40 GB.
This amount of alarms are pretty high when knowing that so many alarms
are created based on traffic from just four days. The same applies Bro, which
created almost 100 000 alarms. Snort have a capability to set threshold to re-
duce some of the most created alarms. The two alarms that appeared most
in the full alert file, ’Shellcode x86’ alarms and ICMP PING, could be reduced
significantly by setting up thresholds.
Snort were quite sensitive, but the sensitivity can be configured into the
threshold configuration file. The alarm messages in the alert file are shown in
a way that are easy to read, and the possibility to look up the different snort
id’s is a very good attribute.
The Bro engine were not as sensitive as the Snort engine, but it still created
quite many alarms. And instead of gathering information about each possi-
ble intrusion in one file as Snort, Bro saved various traffic into different logs.
When creating different logs such as http log, ftp log, weird log and further,
there are easier to discover possible intrusions of the different types of attack.
This is the main advantage with the logs created by Bro. But something that
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were disappointing, were the lack of information when looking up the differ-
ent messages shown in the logs.
The Suricata engine turned out to be quite slower than Snort and Bro, when
running against the tcpdump file. Suricata created not even close as many
alarms as Snort and Bro, and one reason for this is that only limited set of rules
were downloaded.
Useful information can be found in the fast log, such as what kind of alarms
that have been triggered. After each alarm in the fast log, one can find several
links to different web sites, where one can find information about the specific
alarm. This is something similar to Snorts Snortid, and are very useful for
finding if the different alarms are either real threats or false positives.
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6.1 How to configure the HP Procurve 1800-24g switch
The steps of configuring the switch are: [24]
1. Connecting a laptop to the switch with a network cable
2. Turn of the wireless of the laptop
3. Set the IP on the laptop to be 192.168.2.10
4. Enter this IP in the web browser at the laptop
5. Entering the configuration page
6. Press continue without username and password
7. Choose which port to mirror traffic from: port 16
8. Choose which port to mirror traffic to: port 2
9. Save changes
6.2 How to install Snort, Bro and Suricata
6.2.1 Needed packages and libraries
There is some libraries that needs to be installed to make Snort, Bro and Suri-
cata to work properly. The libraries or packages are listed below. [25]
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Package Description Required by 
Autotools The “autotools” consist of autoconf, automake, and libtool. 
These will likely be installed on your system. You need the 
autotools if you will be using source from the Bro’s 
Subversion repository. You will need to run autogen.sh 
after you check out the code. We will go through the steps 
below. 




Most OSs will have BIND installed by default. BIND 
(Berkeley Internet Name Domain) is an implementation of 




Most OSs will have bison installed by default. Bison is a 
general-purpose parser generator that converts an annotated 
context-free grammar into an LALR(1) or GLR parser for 
that grammar. 
Bro and Suricata 
 
Flex Most OSs will have flex installed by default. Flex is a tool 
for generating scanners. A scanner, sometimes called a 
tokenizer, is a program which recognizes lexical patterns in 
text. 
Bro and Suricata 
Libdnet Libdnet provides a simplified, portable interface to several 
low-level networking routines. 
Snort 
Libpcap Most OSs will have libpcap installed by default. It is the 
packet capture library. You may need to install it with 
support large files (files large than 2G). If you have a 
Linux kernnel, you will want to configure libpcap for 
PF_RING support. 
Snort, Bro and 
Suricata 
LibYAML LibYAML is a YAML parser and emitter written in C that 
is used to parse the configuration file. 
Suricata 
PCRE The PCRE library is a set of functions that implement 
regular expression pattern matching using the same syntax 
and semantics as Perl 5. 
Snort 
 
6.2. HOW TO INSTALL SNORT, BRO AND SURICATA
These libraries above have to be installed to make Snort, Bro and Suricata
work. Bu there exist other libraries that can be installed as well, to improve
their function. These are not required packages or libraries, but will offer extra
functionality for each of them.[25]
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GnuPG Free implementation of the OpenPGP standard. Bro and 
Suricata 
libcap-ng The libcap-ng library is intended to make programming 
with posix capabilities much easier than the traditional 
libcap library. 
Suricata 
LibGeoIP Ability to determine the location of IP addresses. Bro and 
Suricata (future) 
 
Libmagic Add ability to determine file types, as with the ftp 
analyzer. 
Bro 
Libnet Libnet is a generic networking API that provides 
access to several protocols 
Suricata 
OpenSSL Tough to image a system not having OpenSSL 
installed. It is needed to analyze ssh certificates by the 
HTTP analyzer and for encrypted Bro to Bro 
communication. 
Bro 
PF RING PF_RING is a new type of network socket that 
dramatically improves the packet capture speed. 
Snort, Bro  and 
Suricata 
zlib Libz is a compression library. It is used for 
decompressing HTTP bodies by the HTTP analyzer, 
and for compressed Bro-to-Bro communication. 
Bro 
XML analyzer The XML analyzer is highly-experimental code written 
by Tobias Kiesling. Installation of Xerces-C++ and 
XQilla are required to use the XML analyzer. The code 
allows you to be able to easily adjust analysis 
capabilities to specific XML data formats. Xerces-C++ 
is a validating XML parser written in a portable subset 
of C++. XQilla is an XQuery and XPath 2 library and 
command line utility written in C++. 
Bro and Suricta 
(future) 
libnetfilter_queue libnetfilter_queue is a userspace library providing an 
API to packets that have been queued by the kernel 
packet filter. 
Suricata 
libnfnetlink libnfnetlink is the low-level library for netfilter related 
kernel/userspace communication. It provides a generic 
messaging infrastructure for in-kernel netfilter 
subsystems (such as nfnetlink_log, nfnetlink_queue, 
nfnetlink_conntrack) and their respective users and/or 
management tools in userspace. 
Suricata 
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6.2.2 Installation
The first packages and libraries to install, is the autool packages autoconf, au-
tomake and libtool. This was installed in this way:
• Apt-get install automake
• Apt-get install libtool
• Apt-get install autoconf
Other packages that were installed by apt-get install were:
• Apt-get install bison
• Apt-get install flex
• Apt-get install libmagic-dev
• Apt-get install libssl-dev
• Apt-get install g++
• Apt-get install libncurses5-dev
• Apt-get install svn-buildpackage
• Apt-get install libncurses-dev
• Apt-get install dnet-common
All packages or libraries that is not installed by ’apt-get install’, is installed













Make & make install
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Make & Make install
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ln -s XQilla-2.2.4 xqilla
cd xerces-c-3.1.1
./configure







Make & make check & make install
Libunwind: need to be installed to make perftools work.






Make & make install
OpenSSL
Were installed by apt-get install libssl-dev
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6.2.3 Snort
Snort version 2.9.0.4 was downloaded from
www.snort.org/snort-downloads and to the laptop.
Then it was copied to the machine
"jonas.vlab.iu.hio.no (128.39.73.9)" with winscp,
and put in the folder /usr/src.
Daq version 0.5 was downloaded from
www.snort.org/snort-downloads and to the laptop.
Then it was copied to the machine
"jonas.vlab.iu.hio.no (128.39.73.9)"
























Because of some problems with dnet, these two commands
were put in the /root./.bashrc file:
LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/usr/local/lib
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Export LD_LIBRARY_PATH
In the /usr/src/snort-2.9.0.4 folder






Snort can use their own set of rules from snort.org
and rules from the Emerging Threats site.
One needs to register at snort.org
to get the rules from snort site.
The snort rules "snortrules-snapshot-2904.tar.gz" were downloaded
from www.snort.org/snort-rules to the laptop and copied to
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./autogen.sh
Make & make install
Configure and Install










Brolite and Broctl were installed in the









Two files needed to be copied to /usr/local/bro/etc:
- Bro.rc-hooks.sh needed to be copied from
/usr/local/src/bro-cvs/bro-1.5.3.cvs/scripts
- Bro.cfg needed to be copied from /usr/src/bro-1.5.3/scripts
6.2.5 Suricata
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gpg --import OISF.asc











Make & make check & make install
Mkdir /usr/local/Suricata/log
Mkdir /usr/local/Suricata/etc
Cp classification.config Suricata.yaml /usr/local/Suricata/etc
Mkdir /usr/local/Suricata/rules
Cd /usr/local/Suricata/rules











































6.3 How to run Snort, Bro, Suricata and tcpdump
6.3.1 Snort
When running in the network, Snort is run like this:
/usr/local/snort/bin $:
snort -c /usr/local/snort/etc/snort.conf
-l /var/log/snort -i eth2






When running in the network, Bro is run like this:
/usr/local/bro/bin/ $: broctl start
When running against a tcpdump file, Bro is run like this:
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Tcpdump were run like this:
Approach 1:
tcpdump -i eth2 -s 0 -w jonas_aprilFull2.tcpdump
Approach 2:
tcpdump -i eth1 -s 0 -w test1
tcpdump -i eth2 -s 0 -w test2
6.4 How to install Metasploit framework
The Metasploit Framework were installed by following a guide at www.metasploit.org.
[26]
The Metasploit Framework were installed on a Ubuntu partition.







6.4. HOW TO INSTALL METASPLOIT FRAMEWORK
cp -a msf3 /opt/metasploit3
chown root:root -R /opt/metasploit3/msf3
ln -sf /opt/metasploit3/msf3/* /usr/local/bin
• apt-get install ruby
• apt-get install libopenssl-ruby
• apt-get install libyaml-ruby
• apt-get install libdl-ruby
• apt-get install libiconv-ruby
• apt-get install libreadline-ruby
• apt-get install irb
• apt-get install ri
• apt-get install rubygems
• apt-get install subversion
• apt-get install build-essential
• apt-get install ruby-dev
• apt-get install libpcap-dev
• apt-get install postgresql-8.4
Become the system postgres user
Sudo -s
Su postgres
postgres: createuser msf_user -P
enter password: 12345
enter it again: 12345
Shall the new role be a superuser? (y/n) n
Shall the new role be allowed to create databases? (y/n) n
Shall the new role be allowed to create more new roles? (y/n) n
Postgres: created -owner=msf_user msf_database
Configure Metasploit
Msf > db_driver postgresql
Db_connect msf_user:12345@127.0.0.1:5432/msf_database
Db_hosts ’ list the new database and shows that it is empty,
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since nothing is added yet
Enable the database on startup:




How to run Metasploit:
nmap 128.39.73.9 : open ports are shown and saved to the
created database
db_autopwn -p -t: lists exploits for these open ports
that can be run. Exploits are listed below.
db_autopwn -p -t -e : the exploits liste get run.
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11: exploit/windows/http/maxdb_webdbm_get_overflow
12: exploit/windows/http/apache_mod_rewrite_ldap
13: exploit/unix/webapp/guestbook_ssi_exec
14: exploit/windows/http/hp_nnm_webappmon_execvp
15: exploit/windows/http/altn_webadmin
16: exploit/windows/http/hp_nnm_ovwebsnmpsrv_ovutil
17: exploit/unix/webapp/mitel_awc_exec
18: exploit/unix/webapp/generic_exec
19: exploit/windows/http/hp_nnm_nnmrptconfig_nameparams
20: exploit/unix/webapp/awstats_migrate_exec
21: exploit/windows/isapi/ms03_051_fp30reg_chunked
22: exploit/windows/http/minishare_get_overflow
23: exploit/unix/webapp/base_qry_common
24: exploit/unix/webapp/mambo_cache_lite
25: exploit/unix/webapp/joomla_tinybrowser
26: exploit/windows/http/hp_nnm_ovalarm_lang
27: exploit/windows/http/nowsms
28: exploit/windows/iis/ms03_007_ntdll_webdav
29: exploit/unix/webapp/dogfood_spell_exec
30: exploit/unix/webapp/phpmyadmin_config
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